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Compensation as an Additional Remedy
to Regulatory Taking of Private Property:
An Analysis and Comparison of Federal
and Pennsylvania Case Law
And by a variety of ancient statutes it is enacted, that no man's
lands or goods shall be seized into the king's hands, against the
great charter, and the law of the land; . . unless . . it shall
be redressed . . . . So great moreover is the regard of the law
for private property, that it will not authorize the least violation
of it; no, not even for the general good of the whole community.'
I. Introduction
The "taking clause" of the fifth amendment specifically prohib-
its private property from being taken for public use without just
compensation.2 This concept has been explicitly reiterated in the
Pennsylvania Constitution.3 There has, however, been much contro-
versy in the area of regulatory taking and the proper remedy for it.
The adequacy of the landowner's remedy is seen currently as a cen-
tral issue in land-use controls." The traditional remedy available to
the landowner whose property has been regulated into a nonconform-
ing use has been invalidation of the regulation. 5 More recently, how-
ever, monetary, compensation has been discussed as an alternative
remedy, based on a theory closely aligned with inverse condemna-
tion.6 The two basic questions which must be asked are: first, can the
1. 1 W. BLACKSTONE. COMMENTARIES 139.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This amendment was made applicable to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. See Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226 (1897).
3. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 10 states "nor shall private property be taken or applied to public
use, without authority of law and without just compensation being first made or secured."
4. R. ELLICKSON & A. TERLOCK, LAND USE CONTROLS 27 (Supp. 1984); N.Y. Times,
Oct. 19, 1985, at 34, col. 1.
5. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal.3d 266, 276-77, 598 P.2d 25, 31, 157 Cal. Rptr.
372, 377-78 (1979), affd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Atlantic Ltd. v. Hudson,
574 F. Supp. 1381, 1406 (E.D. Va. 1983); Pamel Corp. v. Puerto Rico Highway Authority,
621 F.2d 33, 35 (1st Cir. 1980); Mandelker, Land Use Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491 (1981).
6.
The phrase "inverse condemnation" appears to be one that was coined simply as
a shorthand description of the manner in which a landowner recovers just com-
pensation for a taking of his property when condemnation proceedings have not
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governmental exercise of its regulatory police power effect a "tak-
ing" within the purview of the fifth amendment?; and second, must
the government pay compensatory damages as a remedy when such
a taking occurs?
7
This comment first analyzes and discusses, in light of recent
federal case law, the legality of compensation as an alternative rem-
edy to regulatory taking.8 This discussion explores the exact nature
of a taking,9 when such a taking is compensable, 10 the case for ac-
ceptance or rejection of compensation as a remedy," and the other
available remedies.' 2 The discussion then examines the history of
regulatory taking and inverse condemnation under Pennsylvania case
law.13 In conclusion, the comment suggests that Pennsylvania adopt
compensation as an alternative remedy to invalidation, since Penn-
sylvania law presently prevents an aggrieved landowner from ob-
taining monetary relief for takings as a result of harsh zoning
ordinances.
II. The Nature of a Taking - The Federal System
The fifth amendment explicitly permits the government to ap-
propriate private property for the public use by exercising its con-
demnation or eminent domain power.' It is also well established
that the government must pay just monetary compensation for the
been instituted . . . . A condemnation proceeding, by contrast, typically involves
an action by the condemnor to effect a taking and acquire title. The phrase
"inverse condemnation," as a common understanding of that phrase would sug-
gest, simply describes an action that is the "inverse" or "reverse" of a condem-
nation proceeding.
United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980); "[llnverse condemnation is a cause of
action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of property which has been taken
in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent
domain has been attempted by the taking agency." D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND
DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW 328-29 (1971).
7. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 646 (1981) (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
8. For an excellent discussion of land regulations and the compensation remedy, see
Comment, Just Compensation or Just Invalidation: The Availability of a Damages Remedy
in Challenging Land Use Regulations, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 711 (1982); Mandelker, Land Use
Takings: The Compensation Issue, 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 491 (1981); Cunningham, Inverse
Condemnation as a Remedy for "Regulatory Takings", 8 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 517 (1981);
Johnson, Compensation for Invalid Land-Use Regulations, 15 GA. L. REV. 559 (1981).
9. See infra notes 14-74 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 75-91 and accompanying text.
Ii. See infra notes 92-99 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 100-129 and accompanying text.
14. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943) (the compensation required under
the fifth amendment is the fair market value on the date of taking); P. NICHOLS, EMINENT
DOMAIN § 1.11 (3d ed. 1971).
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taking of such property.1" Additionally, there exists a governmental
police power which enables the government to regulate land for the
public health, safety, general welfare and morals.1" Abuse of this po-
lice power permits the landowner to claim a "taking" of his property
under the doctrine of inverse condemnation. 17 The landowner's argu-
ment rests on the conclusion that when the police power is exercised
in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner18 the regulation
results in a deprivation of property rights, which may only be taken
through the use of the state's eminent domain power. Therefore, the
landowner argues, he is deserving of compensation. The inevitable
result is that the courts must make the determination whether land
use regulations pass muster under the Constitutional taking test.
The difference between inverse condemnation and the abuse of
regulatory police power, which concerns the landowner, is that when
a use of police power is excessive and confiscatory, the landowner
must seek to have it invalidated as unconstitutional. 19 In an inverse
condemnation suit, the governmental action already has taken the
landowner's alleged property right and the landowner's claim is for
monetary damages.20 The issue then becomes one of line drawing,
for it has long been recognized that at some point an exercise of the
police power ceases to be valid and becomes a taking. Although the
15. See generally P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN (3d ed. 1971); UNIFORM EMINENT Do-
MAIN CODE - U.L.A. - (1974) (provides standards for the acquisition of property by
condemnors, the conduct of condemnation actions, and the determination of just
compensation).
16. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
17. For an in depth discussion of inverse condemnation and its applicability to landown-
ers who have been damaged by a highway improvement, see MANDELKER, INVERSE CONDEM-
NATION: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY (1964) (prepared under
contract between the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of Public Roads and
the Washington University School of Law).
18. See, e.g., Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928).
19. E.g., Williamson Co. Regional Planning v. Hamilton Bank, - U.S. -, (1985);
San Diego Gas & Elect. Co. v. San Diego, 80 Cal. App. 3d 1026, __ P.2d __ , 146 Cal.
Rptr. 103 (1978), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal.3d
266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980);
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
20. For a general discussion of inverse condemnation, see Van Alstyne, Taking or Dam-
aging by Police Power. The Search for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. I
(1971); Note, Inverse Condemnation: The Case for Diminution in Property Value as Compen-
sable Damage, 28 STAN. L. REV. 779 (1976).
21. See. e.g., Williamson Co. Regional Planning v. Hamilton Bank, - U.S. -
(1985); San Diego Gas & Elect. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). See
also MacLeod v. County of Santa Clara, 749 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984); Atlantic Ltd. v. Hud-
son, 574 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Va. 1983); Devines v. Maier, 665 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1981);
Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981).
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state's exercise of its police power is not limitless,22 it is also true
that government would be unable to operate if it had to pay compen-
sation every time a landowner's property value diminished.23
Justice Holmes stated in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,2"
however, that "[tihe general rule at least is, that while property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking."2 5 Unfortunately, Justice Holmes failed to
provide any criteria for determining when a regulation had gone too
far, and merely stated that it "is a question of degree - and there-
fore cannot be disposed of by general propositions. 2 6 Criteria have
evolved, but have been based on the particular facts in each case.27
Although a presumption of constitutionality is given to regulations
by the courts, 8 there is widespread agreement that if a regulation
renders a property stripped of all economic viability,29 there has been
an abuse of the police power and compensation must be made."0
On this ad hoc basis, an attempt has been made to rationalize
"taking" law in a number of landmark cases. Penn Central Trans-
portation Co. v. New York City,3 1 a case in which Penn Central
Transportation Company wanted to build an office building over
Grand Central Terminal, exemplified the problem of an absence of
set guidelines and the necessity for determination on a case by case
basis. 2 The Penn Central decision concluded that a taking had not
22. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
23. Id. at 413.
24. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
25. Id. at 415.
26. Id. at 416 (Justice Holmes did, however, mention diminution in value to the prop-
erty as a chief criteria).
27. The determination of when a taking has occurred has been described by one author
as "characterized by confusing and incompatible result, often explained in conclusionary ter-
minology, circular reasoning and empty rhetoric." Van Alstyne, supra note 20, at 2.
28. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971) (It is fundamental to jurisprudence that
enactments of the legislature are clothed with a presumption of constitutional validity, and
that appellants, by claiming that an act is unconstitutional, carry a heavy burden of proof).
29. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978).
30. The appropriate remedy for a regulatory taking, invalidation and/or compensation,
will be discussed infra notes 75-99 and accompanying text.
31. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
32. While this Court has recognized that the 'Fifth Amendment's guarantee ...
[is) designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole,' Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960), this Court, quite
simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for determining when 'jus-
tice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be com-
pensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated
on a few persons . . . . Indeed, we have frequently observed that whether a
particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay
for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely 'upon the particular cir-
cumstances [in that] case.'
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occurred because the regulation did not impinge upon the structure's
present use. The Court specifically took into consideration the effect
on the economic use of the building and found that "the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct38 investment backed
expectations are of course relevant considerations. ' 4 The court de-
termined that it is not sufficient that the restriction denies the owner
the most beneficial use of his property. 5 It is also not sufficient that
the restriction denies the owner a beneficial use to which the prop-
erty had previously been devoted.36 Additionally it is simply not
enough that the property's value has been substantially diminished
without compensation. 7 Whether "the interference with property
can be characterized as a physical invasion by Government [or
whether the] interference arises from some public program adjusting
the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common
good" is, however, an important consideration.38 In determining
whether the governmental act in question is to be considered a tak-
ing, a court should focus both on the character of the action and on
the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as
a whole.39
These considerations outlined by the Penn Central decision still
did not give substantial guidance for the formulation of a solution to
the problem of an absence of guidelines recognized by Justice
Holmes. Each individual court still has wide discretion as to when to
consider a use of the police power a taking. Each court will weigh
private property rights against the rights of the public and make its
own determination of when a regulatory taking has occurred. °
Id. at 123-24. In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-69 (1887) the Court had inferred that
the police power had primacy over the just compensation clause.
A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by
valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals or safety of the commu-
nity, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of prop-
erty for the public benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the
control or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose
of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use by any one, for certain
forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests.
33. The adjective "distinct" was modified to "reasonable" in Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980).
34. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
35. Id. at 125.
36. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
37. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131.
38. Id. at 124.
39. Id. at 130.
40. The Supreme Court did set outer equitable limits of fairness and justice in Arm-
strong v. U.S. where it stated:
The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a
public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from
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The approach espoused in Penn Central was followed in Andrus
v. Allard.41 Regulations established by the Secretary of the Interior
under the Eagle Protection and Migratory Bird Treaty Acts prohib-
ited sales of parts of protected birds, even though legally killed
before they became protected by these regulations. 4 The regulations
were challenged as constituting a taking of property without com-
pensation under the fifth amendment. The Court determined that
"the denial of one traditional property right does not always amount
to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full 'bundle' of
property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a
taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety."43 The
Court also explored the appellee's continued ability to derive eco-
nomic benefit from the artifacts, and after balancing the relative
benefits and burdens involved, the Court concluded that a taking had
not occurred." Thus, the Court continued to make strides in identi-
fying various factors that ought to be considered when making the
determination of when a taking has occurred. Once again, however,
the Court failed to articulate a formulation lower courts should ap-
ply in balancing and assigning relative weights to these factors.
The Court took a narrower approach in Kaiser-Aetna v. United
States .4  Kaiser-Aetna claimed a taking of private property, and
asked for compensation for the value of public access given to a ma-
rina created by Kaiser-Aetna, out of what was previously non-navi-
gable waters owned by Kaiser-Aetna. The Court noted that the right
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and jus-
tice, should be borne by the public as a whole.
364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
41. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
42. The pertinent parts of the regulations provide:
50 CFR § 21.2(a) (1978): Migratory birds, their parts, nests, or eggs, lawfully
acquired prior to the effective date of Federal protection under the Migratory
Bird Treaty Act ... may be possessed or transported without a Federal permit,
but may not be imported, exported, purchased, sold, bartered, or offered for
purchase, sale, trade, or barter ....
50 CFR § 22.2(a)(1978): Bald eagles, alive or dead, or their parts, nests or eggs
lawfully acquired prior to June 8, 1940, and golden eagles, alive or dead, or their
parts, nests, or eggs lawfully acquired prior to October 24, 1962, may be pos-
sessed, or transported without a federal permit, but may not be imported, ex-
ported, purchased, sold, traded, bartered, or offered for purchase, sale, trade or
barter ....
Id. at 54.
43. Id. at 65-66.
44. Another example of a case in which the benefits and burdens were balanced to deter-
mine whether or not there was a regulatory taking was Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Rob-
bins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). In this case, the Court upheld a provision of the California Constitu-
tion that permitted distribution of pamphlets within a shopping center whose owners wanted to
prohibit such distribution.
45. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
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to exclude the public from private property was "fundamental" to a
property right, and that the forced admittance of the public to the
marina was akin to physical invasion and, therefore, a taking. The
Court did not, however, give indications as to what other property
rights were fundamental. The Court noted that "[tihis is not a case
in which the Government is exercising its regulatory power in a
manner that will cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioner's
private property; rather, the imposition of the navigational servitude
in this context will result in an actual physical invasion of the pri-
vately owned marina.""
In San Diego Gas & Electric v. San Diego,47 the dissenting
opinion cited Kaiser-Aetna for the proposition that "the Court fre-
quently has found 'takings' outside the context of formal condemna-
tion proceedings or transfer of fee simple, in cases where government
action benefiting the public resulted in destruction of the use and
enjoyment of private property."48 Two cases have received much at-
tention in the area of "takings" by exercise of the government's po-
lice power, Agins v. City of Tiburon,49 and San Diego. A third "tak-
ings" case recently considered by the Supreme Court is Williamson
Co. Regional Planning v. Hamilton Bank.
50
In Agins, subsequent to appellants acquiring unimproved land
in Tiburon, California, the city implemented a comprehensive open
space plan. The zoning ordinance placed density restrictions on the
property owners' tract of land. Landowners attacked the ordinance
as unconstitutional on its face even though they never tried to gain
approval for the development of their land within the purview of the
new zoning ordinances. The California Supreme Court considered
the inverse condemnation claim and held as a matter of law that an
owner of real property could not "sue in inverse condemnation and
thereby transmute an excessive use of the police power into a lawful
taking for which compensation in eminent domain must be paid."'"
The California Supreme Court concluded that the appropriate rem-
edy was invalidation through declaratory relief, the traditional
remedy.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the California
46. Id. at 180. For a discussion of how the fifth amendment "taking" clause is made
applicable to coastal property, see MacRae, Governmentally Created Erosion on the Seashore:
The Fifth Amendment Washed Away, 89 DICK. L. REV. 101 (1984).
47. 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
48. Id. at 651-52.
49. 24 Cal.3d 266, 598 P.2d 25, 157 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1979), affid, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
50. 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
51. 450 U.S. 621, 641-42 (1981).
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court's determination that the ordinances on their face did not take
landowners' property without just compensation.5 2 The Court, there-
fore, never reached the issue of whether compensation was an availa-
ble remedy to a regulatory taking, because the Court simply deter-
mined that a taking did not exist.53 The Court did outline certain
factors which would be helpful in determining whether a taking had
occurred.5 4 The Court balanced the private and public interests and
concluded, "[tihe determination that governmental action constitutes
a taking is, in essence, a determination that the public at large,
rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of
state power in the public interest."55
Another California case, San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City
of San Diego, examined a zoning action alleged to be a taking. In
San Diego, the Court failed to reach the issue of whether a mone-
tary remedy should be available to a landowner whose property has
been taken under the fifth amendment because a majority of the
Court found that no final judgment had been rendered. The city of
San Diego had rezoned land previously acquired by the appellant,
which reduced the amount of land available for industrial use.
Through the establishment of a city-wide open space plan, a proposal
was made that part of appellants' land be acquired for a public
park. The city had made no attempt to acquire the property
through eminent domain, however, and the open space plan re-
mained in effect.57 The California Supreme Court remanded the case
to the court of appeals for reconsideration in light of the intervening
decision in Agins.58 The court of appeals reversed its previous grant
of compensation, and the California Supreme Court denied any fur-
ther review of the matter.5 9 The United States Supreme Court, rely-
ing on the ripeness doctrine, held that the judgment appealed from
was not a final order under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which allows the Su-
preme Court to review only final judgments of a state court."0
The importance of San Diego lies in its dissent. This dissenting
52. 447 U.S. at 259.
53. Id. at 263.
54. In Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928), the Court stated that a taking
was effected if the ordinance did not substantially advance legitimate state interests. Addition-
ally, in Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978), a taking was considered effected if an
ordinance denied the owner economically viable use of his land.
55. 447 U.S. at 260.
56. 450 U.S. at 625.
57. Id. at 625.
58. Id. at 628-29.
59. Id. at 629-30.
60. Id. at 633.
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opinion, written by Justice Brennan, addressed not only whether a
taking of the appellants' property had occurred, but also whether
monetary compensation should be available if it had occurred."1 Jus-
tice Brennan reiterated the position held by the California courts
that an abuse of the police power cannot, as a matter of constitu-
tional law, effect a taking under the fifth amendment. Then he stated
"[tlhis holding flatly contradicts clear precedents of this Court.6 He
went on to explain the similarity between regulatory takings and
other takings.' s In this regard there is no difference to the property
owner: one party is benefited and one party is deprived. Intent is not
the controlling factor. "[Tihe Constitution measures a taking of
property not by what a State says, or by what it intends, but by what
it does."64
One of the Supreme Court's most recent decisions on regulatory
taking is Williamson Co. Regional Planning v. Hamilton Bank.65
The county in Williamson had changed its zoning ordinance from
allowing cluster development to requiring that calculations of allowa-
ble density exclude ten percent of the total acreage to account for
roads and utilities.66 The respondent's land plan had been prelimina-
rily approved under the old zoning laws and reapproved by the zon-
ing commission. The following year the commission changed its posi-
tion and decided to apply the new zoning laws to the property. The
61. Justice Stewart, Justice Marshall and Justice Powell also joined in Justice Brennan's
dissent. Justice Rehnquist stated that he agreed with Brennan's dissent but felt there was not a
final decree under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Had the Court reached the merits, Justice Brennan's
dissent would have been the majority opinion.
62. 450 U.S. at 647. Justice Brennan cited Pruneyard, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980); Agins,
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980); Kaiser-Aetna, 444 U.S. 164, 174 (1979); Penn Central, 438 U.S.
104 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); United States v. Central
Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958); Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922).
63. Justice Brennan cited Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954), as a typical taking
in which a landowner's property is taken by formal eminent domain proceedings. He then went
on to cite Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166, 177-78 (1872) for the proposition that:
[i]t would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result, if in construing [the Just
Compensation Clause] . . . it shall be held that if the government refrains from
the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of the public it can destroy
it's value entirely, can inflict irreparable and permanent injury to any extent,
can, in effect, subject it to total destruction without making any compensation,
because, in the narrowest sense of that word, it is not taken for the public use.
Justice Brennan gave other examples of the various natures of a taking. E.g., Kaiser Aetna,
444 U.S. at 178-80 (navigational servitude allowing public right of access); United States v.
Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 750-51 (1947) (property flooded because of government dam pro-
ject); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261-62 (1946) (frequent low altitude flight of
Army and Navy aircraft over property) Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 414-16 (state
regulation forbidding mining of coal).
64. Hughes v. Washington, 389 U.S. 290, 298 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
65. 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
66. Id. at 3113.
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commission denied approval of respondent's development plan due to
its failure to comply with the density requirements.6 7 A jury deter-
mined that there was a denial of the respondent's "economically via-
ble" use of the property in question. This was found to be in viola-
tion of the "just compensation clause," and the commission was
estopped from forcing the respondent to comply with the newly en-
acted zoning ordinances. Additionally, the jury awarded monetary
damages for the temporary taking of the respondent's property.68
The court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the
grounds that a temporary "taking" cannot, as a matter of law, con-
stitute a "taking" under the fifth amendment. The trial court's deci-
sion was reversed by the court of appeals 69 which recognized the
doctrine espoused in Agins that a taking occurs if an owner is denied
the economically viable use of his land.70 The United States Su-
preme Court, for the third time, avoided addressing the issue of reg-
ulatory taking and its proper remedy. 71 The Court concluded that
the issue was once again not ripe for decision due to a lack of a final
decree at the state level.72 In addition, the Court determined that the
taking claim was not ripe because of the failure on the part of the
respondent to seek compensation through state procedures.73 Justice
Brennan concurred in the Court's opinion as to the finality of the
judgment at the state level, but reiterated the position he established
in his San Diego dissent.
Currently, federal case law recognizes that an abuse of the po-
lice power can effect a regulatory taking of private property. This
conclusion is well established and is a firm doctrine of federal fifth
amendment interpretation. The Supreme Court has utilized a case
by case analysis since Pennsylvania Coal to determine when an ex-
cessive use of police power can effect a taking. The remedy for this
taking of private property is addressed in the next section.
III. The Compensability of a Taking - The Federal System
When a taking occurs, it is determined upon the particular facts
67. Id. at 3114.
68. Id. at 3115.
69. Id. at 3115.
70. 447 U.S. at 260.
71. The other two occasions were the Agins and San Diego decisions.
72. 105 S. Ct. at 3117 (there was still the opportunity to apply for variances).
73. The Court specifically mentioned the failure to try and gain compensation provided
by the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491. Furthermore, the respondent had not availed himself of
the state's inverse condemnation procedures.
74. 105 S. Ct. at 3124.
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in each case, using certain criteria, whether or not there was an
abuse of the state's police power. The determination of what remedy
should be available once that taking occurs varies. There is a contin-
uum, ranging from prohibiting damages to promoting them, upon
which each court makes its determination as to allowable remedies.
Some jurisdictions refuse, as a matter of law, to allow damages as a
remedy for a regulatory taking. Those courts view the traditional
remedy of invalidation as the sole basis of relief.L7 Other courts,
however, hold that compensation is the only real form of equitable
relief. Generally, there has been agreement that a damage action is
appropriate in the case of a physical invasion by a regulating
agency.7
When the taking of private property occurs through federal
agency regulation, the court can opt to provide compensation, not by
inverse condemnation, but by the invocation of the Tucker Act. The
Tucker Act allows the recovery of damages for government actions
which impinge upon property rights." The situation is different
where a court must determine whether to apply the fifth amend-
ment's just compensation clause to make available a remedy to a
landowner whose property has been taken by an abuse of a state's
police power.
In Pennsylvania Coal, the decision revealed that a taking can
occur through an abuse of the police power.7 8 Interpreting this the-
ory to allow for the proper remedy would suggest that once a taking
has been found, the regulation imposed upon the landowner was in-
voked under the guise of the state's eminent domain power. This in-
dicates that there is a right of compensation arising out of the origi-
nal taking.79 This reasoning has never been espoused by the Supreme
Court in a case in which the Court has reached the merits on the
compensation issue. There has, however, been strong dicta indicating
75. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal.3d 266, 276-77, 598 P.2d 25, 31, 157 Cal. Rptr.
372, 377-78 (1979), affid on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
76. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), the
Court announced a per se rule that any permanent physical invasion and occupation of prop-
erty authorized by the government was a fifth amendment taking without regard to the public
interests that it might serve. See also Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978); Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1976) provides:
The Court of Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim
against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or
implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated dam-
ages in cases not sounding in tort.
78. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
79. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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that this type of reasoning will soon be adopted. 80
Very few cases involving a claim for damages due to state regu-
latory takings have reached the Supreme Court." In Agins v. City of
Tiburon,"2 an inverse condemnation claim for damages was never de-
cided on the ground that "[b]ecause no taking [had] occurred, we
need not consider whether a State may limit the remedies available
to a person whose land [had] been taken without just compen-
sation."83
A reasonable inference to be drawn from this sentence is that a
decision by the highest court of a state that the fifth amendment
entitles an owner to an award of compensation for a regulatory
taking would not be disturbed. Because a state legislature
clearly has the power to provide compensation when none is re-
quired by the fifth amendment, it would follow that the highest
court of a state could do the same, even though it does so in the
possibly mistaken belief that this is required by the fifth and
fourteenth amendments.8"
The dissenting opinion in San Diego,"8 in which Justice Brennan
addressed the merits of the compensation issue, provides the strong-
est language in favor of the adoption of compensation as the proper
remedy for regulatory takings.86 The rationale of the dissent is that
once a taking has been effected, whether by regulation, eminent do-
main or physical invasion, "the self-executing character of the con-
stitutional provision with respect to compensation is triggered. 8 7
Compensation must be given once a taking is found.88 Common
sense dictates that the public bear the cost of the benefits it receives
by returning the private landowner to the status quo ante before his
80. See Williamson Co. Regional Planning v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985);
San Diego Gas & Elect. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
81. Williamson Co. Regional Planning v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985); San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
82. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
83. 447 U.S. at 263.
84. Johnson, supra note 8 at 586.
85. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
86. In my view, once a court establishes that there was a regulatory "taking," the
Constitution demands that the government entity pay just compensation for the
period commencing on the date the regulation first effected the "taking" and
ending on the date the government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend
the regulation.
450 U.S. at 653 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 654 (citations omitted).
88. "Invalidation unaccompanied by payment of damages would hardly compensate the
landowner for any economic loss suffered during the time his property was taken." Id. at 655.
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property had been taken.89 This position was reiterated in William-
son County Regional Planning v. Hamilton Bank.90 Justice Stevens,
concurring in the decision, affirmed the position espoused by Justice
Brennan's dissent in San Diego regarding the merits. 1 Thus, the Su-
preme Court has expanded the scope of circumstances in which use
of police power becomes a taking. Furthermore, the Court is moving
towards encouraging compensation as a remedy for regulatory tak-
ings due to the inadequacy of the invalidation remedy.
9 2
Many arguments, both for and against compensation, have
arisen. Arguments against providing compensation include the con-
tention that there will be a chilling effect on the government's exer-
cise of regulatory police powers.93 Critics of the compensation rem-
edy allege that creativity and innovation will be thwarted in the area
of land use control. Additionally, it is argued that regulating bodies
will be overly conservative in planning so as not to incur liability
upon the local government.
These arguments are misfounded, however, for it has been
shown that all administrative remedies must be exhausted before a
89. A viable approach would be to assess the measure of damages as an amount equal to
just compensation for the value of the property during the period of the taking. However, a
taking would not occur until the municipality's governing body is given a realistic opportunity
and reasonable time within which to revise its zoning legislation vis-a-vis the particular prop-
erty and to correct the inequity. See Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir.
1981).
90. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
91. [I]f [the government] is not entitled to improve an uncompensated permanent
harm on the property owner - the court can express its ruling on the merits by
stating that the regulation is invalid, or by characterizing it as a "taking." In
either event, the essence of the holding is a conclusion that the harm caused by
the regulation is one that the government may not impose unless it is prepared to
pay for it.
105 S. Ct. at 3125 (Stevens, J., concurring).
92. The Court has seen the Civil Rights Act, section 1983, as a possible statutory rem-
edy to recover damages based on inverse condemnation:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Additionally, it has been argued that there is a due process
claim based on the contention that the exercise of the police power is not in fact in furtherance
of the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. Therefore, it is argued the regulation
deprives the landowner of property without due process of law, thus entitling him to damages.
See Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 227 U.S. 183 (1928).
93. See Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal.3d 110, 120, 514 P.2d
111, 117, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 805 (1973) ("If a governmental entity and its responsible offi-
cials were held subject to a claim for inverse condemnation . . . the process of community
planning would . . . grind to a halt").
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judicial claim of inverse condemnation can be successfully brought.94
An additional response to the "chilling effect" argument is that the
threat of compensation liability will give rise to more responsible
planning. This is seen as a better alternative to the present situation
whereby the regulatory body promulgates ordinances which the
courts eventually must evaluate as either passing or failing constitu-
tional muster.95 The argument that a chilling effect will occur has
been accurately described as "a speculative argument lacking empir-
ical support. Given realistic regulatory efforts and the stringent re-
quirements necessary to demonstrate a taking, a damages remedy
would impose a minimal fiscal threat on legitimate and good faith
planning, and its effect would perhaps even be healthy."'
Certainly the strongest case for the compensation remedy is the
inadequacy of the invalidation remedy. Although invalidation gives
the landowner his property back without restriction, the property
owner has still suffered some inequities. He will continue to be sub-
ject to the regulating body's conduct that will once again impinge
94. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. See also Williamson Co. Regional Plan-
ning v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985); San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
95. The argument of a possible chilling effect was considered and refuted in Justice
Brennan's dissent in San Diego in which he stated:
Indeed, land-use planning commentators have suggested that the threat of finan-
cial liability for unconstitutional police power regulations would help to produce
a more rational basis of decision making that weighs the cost of. . .restrictions
against their benefits. Such liability might also encourage municipalities to err
on the constitutional side of police power regulations, and to develop internal
and operating procedures to minimize overzealous regulatory attempts ....
After all, if a policeman must know the Constitution, then why not a planner. In
any event, one may wonder as an empirical matter whether the threat of just
compensation will greatly impede the efforts of planners ....
450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
96. Comment, supra note 8, at 732. Other arguments for invalidation include unman-
ageable fiscal costs, the position that invalidation is an adequate equitable remedy and judicial
deference to the legislature. See Comment, supra note 8, at 725-732; Johnson supra note 8, at
585. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal.3d 266, 276, 598 P.2d 25, 30, 157 Cal. Rptr.
372, 377 (1979), in which the California Court stated:
We envisage that the availability of an inverse condemnation remedy in these
situations would pose yet another threat to legislative control over appropriate
land-use determinations. It has been noted that 'the weighing of costs and bene-
fits is essentially a legislative process. In enacting a zoning ordinance, the legisla-
tive body assesses the desirability of a program on the assumption that compen-
sation will not be required to achieve the objectives of that ordinance.
Determining that a particular land-use control requires compensation is an ap-
propriate function of the judiciary, whose function includes protection of individ-
uals against excesses of government. But it seems to force compensation. Invali-
dation, rather than forced compensation, would seem to be the more expedient
means of remedying legislative excesses.' (citation omitted)
This rationale was never adopted by the Supreme Court, as Agins was affirmed on other
grounds. In fact, this rationale was harshly criticized by Justice Brennan in San Diego Gas &
Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 656-57 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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upon his property rights. Reregulation is likely to be forthcoming as
regulating agencies are well aware that "[a] successful defense to
the imposition of one regulation does not erect a constitutional bar-
rier to all other regulation. ' 7
Reregulation thereby accomplishes what the regulating body
wants to accomplish without it ever having to incur the liabilities of
a judgment against it. This course of action is a practice recom-
mended by some solicitors and regulatory agencies. The City Attor-
ney of Thousand Oaks, California encouraged government "back-
handedness" when he stated:
If legal preventative maintenance does not work, and you still
get a claim attacking the land use regulation, or if you try the
case and lose, don't worry about it. All is not lost. One of the
extra "goodies" contained in the recent Supreme Court case of
Selby v. City of Buenaventura, 10 Cal.3d 110, appears to allow
the city to change the restriction in question, even after trial and
judgment, make it more reasonable, more restrictive, or
whatever, and everybody starts over again. . . .See how easy it
is to be a City Attorney. Sometimes you can lose the battle and
still win the war. Good luck."8
Another drawback of the invalidation remedy is that it fails to
provide restitution for property "taken" during the period in which
the invalidated regulation was in effect. A temporary taking is still a
taking nonetheless, and is deserving of compensation for a period be-
ginning with the time the regulation went into effect until the time
of the regulations' invalidation, amendment or recission.99 In the
temporary "taking," the harm has already been done and the sole
remaining remedy is compensation. The government is being asked
simply to pay for the harm which it has already caused.
The Supreme Court has become more responsive to the private
landowner's property rights. Through recent interpretations of the
fifth amendment's just compensation clause, the Court's trend has
97. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 597 (1962).
98. Longtin, Avoiding and Defending Constitutional Attacks on Land Use Regulations
(Including inverse Condemnation) 38B NIMLO MUNICIPAL L.J. 175, 192 (1972). This quota-
tion was cited by Justice Brennan in his dissent in San Diego, 450 U.S. at 656-57, for the
proposition that invalidation was clearly an inadequate remedy.
99. As stated by Justice Brennan in his dissent in San Diego, 450 U.S. at 657:
Nothing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests that 'takings' must be perma-
nent and irrevocable. Nor does the temporary reversible quality of a regulatory
'taking' render compensation for the time of the 'taking' any less obligatory.
This Court more than once has recognized that temporary reversible 'takings'
should be analyzed according to the same constitutional framework applied to
permanent irreversible 'takings.'
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been to keep pace with the ever-increasing threats to private prop-
erty by allowing a more expansive set of circumstances to trigger
recognition of a "taking" through regulation. Furthermore, recent
opinions suggest that upon reaching the compensation issue, the
Court will find compensation to be an additional remedy for regula-
tory taking under the guise of the fifth amendment.
IV. An Analysis of Pennsylvania Case Law
Pennsylvania is confused by semantics regarding the proper
remedy for regulatory taking of private property. Throughout a se-
ries of cases in which the intention to compensate the aggrieved
landowner has been evident, the Pennsylvania courts have continued
to resort to form over substance instead of, more appropriately, sub-
stance over form. Throughout the history of Pennsylvania case law
addressing takings of private property, there has been language sug-
gesting that a taking occurs when an abuse of the state's police
power becomes so excessive that it denies the landowner economi-
cally viable use of his property. 100 Indeed, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has embraced the often cited words of Justice Holmes in
Pennsylvania Coal,'0° but has not implemented those words when
dealing with invalid zoning restrictions.
The Pennsylvania courts distinguish the state's police power
from its eminent domain power as if there were a bright line be-
tween the two which could never be crossed. This distinction was
clearly articulated in White's Appeal,'0' in which the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court declared that:
Police power involves the regulation of property to promote
health, safety and general welfare and its exercise requires no
compensation to the property owner, even if there is an actual
taking or destruction of property, while eminent domain is the
power to take property for public use, and compensation must be
given for property taken injured or destroyed.'0 '
100. See, e.g., Henry v. County of Allegheny, 403 Pa. 272, 169 A.2d 874 (1961) (A
right to petition for the assessment of damages for the taking occasioned by the change in
grade of a right of way from that provided in a condemnation plan, accrued to abutting prop-
erty owners where the owners were substantially deprived of the beneficial use of their
property).
101. See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
102. 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409 (1926).
103. Id. at 264, 134 A. at 411. This distinction was reiterated in Reilly v. Department of
Environmental Resources, 37 Pa. Commw. 608, 611, 391 A.2d 56, 58 (1978) (quoting White's
Appeal, 287 Pa. 259, 264, 134 A. 409, 411 (1926)), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
stated that:
Police power should not be confused with that of eminent domain. Police power
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This distinction has been the basis for the courts' refusal to recog-
nize an abuse of the state's police power as a taking, under the guise
of Article I, Section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,10 4 for
which compensation must be paid. 08
The enactment of a zoning ordinance which restricts the use of
private property is clearly an exercise of the municipal police power,
and not the power of eminent domain.106 Generally, such zoning or-
dinances are deemed constitutional when enacted for the health,
safety or general welfare of the community.' Additionally, an
abuse of this police power to enact zoning ordinances can effectuate
a taking under the guise of eminent domain. This premise is clearly
embedded in federal case law' 08 and is recognized, purportedly, by
the Pennsylvania courts who "pay lip service" to this widely ac-
cepted principle of law.
An example of this type of judicial schizophrenia can be seen in
the case of In Re Glorioso's Appeal.'0' In this case, the property
owner's land was rezoned into a special district which strictly limited
the use of that land. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court cited Penn-
controls the use of property by the owner, for the public good, its use otherwise
being harmful, while eminent domain and taxation take property for public use.
Under eminent domain, compensation is given for property taken, injured or de-
stroyed, while under the police power no payment is made for a diminution in
use, even though it amounts to an actual taking or destruction of property ....
No matter how seemingly complete our scheme of private ownership may be
under our system of government, all property is held in subordination of the
right of its reasonable regulation by the government clearly necessary to preserve
the health, safety or morals of the people. Obedience to such regulation is not
taking property without due compensation; that clause does not qualify the po-
lice power.
104. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
105. If a "de facto taking" is found to fall under the eminent domain power, section 1-
502(e) of Pennsylvania's Eminent Domain Code is made applicable. Section 1-502(e) states:
"If there has been a compensable injury suffered and no declaration of therefor has been filed,
a condemnee may file a petition for the appointment of viewers substantially in the form pro-
vided for in subsection (a) of this section, setting forth such injury." PA. ST'AT. ANN. tit. 26 §
1-502(e) (Purdon 1986).
106. See Reilly v. Department of Environmental Resources, 37 Pa. Commw. 608, 391
A.2d 56 (1978); See also In re Condemnation by Commw. of Pennsylvania, etc. 69 Pa.
Commw. 609, 452 A.2d 83 (1982) (Commonwealth, in removing billboards for advertising
company's failure to comply with permit ordinances, exercised its police power, not its power
of eminent domain).
107. See Cleaver v. Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964) (The right
to use property is subject to the police power of the state to regulate an owner's use of prop-
erty, provided that the regulation is reasonably necessary to protect the health, safety, welfare
or general morals of the public.); Appeal of Glorioso, 413 Pa. 194, 196 A.2d 668 (1964)
(zoning ordinances must bear a reasonable relationship to police power purposes); Eller v.
Board of Adjustment, 414 Pa. 1, 198 A.2d 863 (1964) (regulations adopted pursuant to the
police power must not be unreasonable, arbitrary or confiscatory).
108. See supra notes 14-74 and accompanying text.
109. 413 Pa. 194, 196 A.2d 668 (1964).
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sylvania Coal for the proposition that at some point a regulation be-
comes a taking. 110 Then the court defined that point as being "de-
pendent upon a reasonable relationship to the police power asserted
for the public welfare." ' This point was deemed to have been
reached due to the court's finding that "the Borough has singled out
and created a small 'island' of severely restricted uses." Yet, inexpli-
cably, the court declined to find a "taking" and simply invalidated
the ordinance as unconstitutional.
The Pennsylvania courts are meticulous in spelling out when an
abuse of the police power constitutes a taking. This determination,
made largely on an ad hoc basis, parallels to a large extent the ap-
proach taken by the United States Supreme Court. In Cleaver v.
Board of Adjustment,112 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recog-
nized that the line dividing eminent domain and police power must,
at times, be crossed. The Cleaver court stated that; "[a] 'taking' is
not limited to an actual physical possession or seizure of the prop-
erty; if the effect of the zoning law or regulation is to deprive a prop-
erty owner of the lawful use of his property it amounts to a 'taking,'
for which he must be justly compensated."
' 3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has cited Armstrong v.
U.S.'1 4 to aid in defining when a taking is effected. Furthermore, the
Pennsylvania courts have stated that a property owner is entitled to
relief for a taking when his property rights have been unreasonably
restricted. 115 In Andress v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of Phila-
delphia,"" the court reinforced the position that no legislative body,
nor any zoning or planning commission, had the right under any ex-
110. Id. at 197, 196 A.2d at 671.
III. Id. at 197, 196 A.2d at 670.
112. 414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964).
113. Id. at 372, 200 A.2d at 412. In Cleaver, the court determined that the challenged
ordinance was constitutional and therefore it did not need to come to a conclusion as to
whether a "taking" had occurred.
114. Pennsylvania, etc. v. Pennsylvania Gas, 492 Pa. 326, 334, 424 A.2d 1213, 1218
(1980) (quoting Armstrong v. U.S., 364 U.S. 40, 49, (1960)) ("Regulation amounts to a tak-
ing when government forces 'some people alone to bear public burdens, which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' ").
115. See Sunny Farms Ltd. v. North Codorus Twp., 81 Pa. Commw. 371, 380, 474
A.2d 56, 61 (1984). Here the court stated that:
The application of the ordinance [in question], does involve a "taking" in the
sense that appellant is not free to use a substantial percentage of its land for
hazardous waste disposal. [citation omitted]. Such "taking," however, does not
entitle the owner to relief unless the owner's property rights have been unreason-
ably restricted. In order to demonstrate that the ordinance is confiscatory (i.e.
unreasonably restricts land use) [appellant] must prove that the . . . regulation
is too severe or harsh to be "clearly necessary" to protect public health and
safety when balanced against the public interest.
116. 410 Pa. 77, 188 A.2d 709 (1963).
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press or implied power to "take, possess or confiscate private prop-
erty for public use or to completely prohibit or substantially destroy





Similar language is found throughout Pennsylvania case law,
yet the courts never take the final step to find an abuse of the police
power to be a taking under the guise of Article I, section 10 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. 18 When discussing the extent of the po-
117. Id. at 84, 188 A.2d at 712.
118. An exception to that finding is for property taken for streets and highways. The
following is a series of inverse condemnation statutes enacted in Pennsylvania for the purpose
of compensating private landowners whose property has been "taken" through street
improvements.
PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION: PA. CONST. art. I, § 10
SELF-EXECUTING: no cases (statutory procedure since early days).
INVERSE STATUTES: *PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 43, 43a (Purdon 1953).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, §§ 670-205, 670-304, 305, 417, 418, 511, 523, 545, 423,
803, 1005, 1907, 2391.8 (Purdon 1961).
*It has not been possible to list all statutes which govern inverse claims, particu-
larly claims against a political subdivision. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 670-303
(Purdon 1961).
PROCEDURAL: Sections 43 and 43a of title 12 set a six-year statute of limita-
tions for claims arising from takings and damagings.
SUBSTANTIVE: § 670-205. Provides for damages for entry into land to make
surveys etc.
§ 670-304. Provides for state payment of damages for highways built in counties
without the county commissioner's approval. (670-303 provides for county pay-
ment in cases in which the county commissioner's approve). The procedure is
presentation of a-petition by the injured party at the court of quarter sessions.
§ 670-305. Applies to changes in roads intersecting state highways with the
same damage apportionment as in 303 and 304.
§ 670-417. Provides for rights of persons damaged by highway drains and their
construction and maintenance.
§ 670-418. Provides for rights of persons damaged by change of stream channels
by the highway department.
§ 670-423. Provides for rights of persons damaged by detours set up by the
highway department.
§ 670-511. Provides for rights of persons damaged by changes in highways in
boroughs and towns.
§ 670-523. Provides for rights of persons damaged as a result of changes in city
streets taken over by the highway department.
§ 670-545. Provides for rights of persons damaged as a result of changes and
establishment of state highways in second and first class cities.
§ 670-803. With respect to connecting bridges and approaches, provides that
damages are to be ascertained and assessed in the same manner as payment of
damages for widening and relocation in townships.
§ 670-1005. Provides for liability on the part of counties and political subdivi-
sions in the case of federal-aid roads not part of the state highway system.
§ 1907. Provides for damages in the case of entry to lay out public roads.
§ 2391.8. Provides for payment of damages in the case of limited access roads.
Note: It has not been possible to collect all of the Pennsylvania statutes which
are pertinent. However, the statutes listed indicate a pattern of resolving these
problems on a highly particularistic basis. In addition, many of the statutes spec-
ify the type of damage which is compensable. Often consequential damages are
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lice power:
[Pennsylvania's] courts have consistently held an otherwise valid
exercise of the police power does not effectuate a constitutional
taking of property for public use even though (a) its exercise
resulted in the entire suppression of the business . . .; (b) or at
whatever cost to the party introducing the danger being pro-
scribed . . .; and (c) even when it forces the offending industry
out of business .... 119
The question remains: what remedy is available to the aggrieved
landowner for an invalid exercise of the police power which has these
effects?
Even if one were to accept the premise that there is an inherent
distinction between the eminent domain power and the police power,
assuming the Pennsylvania courts are not simply "paying lip service"
to the aggrieved property owner when using the language discussed
above, a property owner must be provided a remedy when a zoning
ordinance operates to confiscate private lands. 120 Presently, "[a]ll
questions involved in zoning ordinances, whether they relate to con-
fiscation of property or to the affect of any of the provisions of an
ordinance, must be heard and considered under the remedy provided
by the Zoning Acts of assembly." 21
It is irreconcilable to hold that the exclusive procedure for chal-
lenging a confiscatory zoning regulation is under the provisions of
Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code, 22 and at the same time
to hold that a taking may occur indirectly through excessive regula-
tion under the exercise of the police power. Inexplicably, this is what
the Pennsylvania courts have been doing and continue to do at pre-
sent. In the case of Gaebel v. Thornbury Township, Delaware
excluded.
CLAIMS STATUTES: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, § 4651-1 (Purdon 1950).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 405, 1003 (Purdon 1949).
APPLICABILITY TO INVERSE: no direct holdings as to either set of
provisions.
4651-1 sets up a Board of Arbitration which is empowered to arbitrate claims
against the state.
405 and 1003 provide for adjustment of all claims against the Commonwealth
on the basis of law and equity and establish a Board of Claims.
Mandelker, supra note 17 at 70-71.
119. Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 23 Pa. Commw. 496, 510, 353 A.2d 471,
479 (1976), affd, 472 Pa. 115, 371 A.2d 461 (1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 807 (1977).
120. Brief for Appellee at 17, Ruby v. Carlisle Zoning Hearing Board, 71 Pa. Commw.
153, 488 A.2d 655 (1985).
121. Taylor v. Moore, 303 Pa. 469, 476, 154 A. 799, 801 (1931).
122. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53 §§ 10101-11202. The sole remedy under the code for an
unduly restrictive zoning ordinance is invalidation.
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County, 28 a property owner's land, originally zoned commercial, was
rezoned as a flood plain, limiting the land's use. The court recited
the necessary amenities of "compensation for a regulatory taking"
but then stated that the exclusive remedy was under the Municipal
Code. This had the effect of forcing the landowner "to contest the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance so as to protect his constitu-
tional property rights.""'
The Commonwealth Court was much more straightforward in
coming to the same contradictory conclusion in Wyoming Borough v.
Wyco Realty Co."8 In this case, the appellants petitioned for an ap-
pointment of viewers for assessment following the borough's adoption
of flood plan management regulations. The court here boldly aligned
itself with the California Supreme Court's decision in Agins 26 for
the proposition that "a property owner cannot seek damages under
provisions of the Eminent Domain Code for the effect upon his prop-
erty of a change in a zoning ordinance.' 21 7 In Merlin v. Common-
wealth,"8 this approach was once again reiterated. In this case the
property owner asserted that the adoption of a flood-plain zoning
regulation had confiscated or unduly restricted the use of his prop-
erty. The court stated that the landowner could not seek compensa-
tion under the Eminent Domain Code, but that his exclusive remedy
was to challenge the validity of the zoning ordinance under the Mu-
nicipal Planning Code. 2 9 This trend in Pennsylvania case law leads
inexorably to the conclusion that the Pennsylvania courts are "speak-
ing out of both sides of their mouths."
V. Conclusion
It is clear that the United States Supreme Court has long recog-
nized that an abuse of the state's police power can effectuate a tak-
ing. Beginning with the Court's decision in Pennsylvania Coal
through San Diego, the Court has been struggling to develop proper
criteria to determine when such a taking occurs. Undoubtedly, at
some point a taking does occur, and at that point the exercise of the
state's police power is equivalent to an exercise of eminent domain
123. 8 Pa. Commw. 379, 303 A.2d 57 (1973).
124. Id. at 411, 303 A.2d at 64 (Kramer, J., dissenting).
125. 64 Pa. Commw. 459, 440 A.2d 696 (1982).
126. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
127. Wyoming Borough v. Wyco Realty Co., 64 Pa. Commw. 459, 461, 440 A.2d 696,
698 (1982).
128. 72 Pa. Commw. 45, 455 A.2d 789 (1983).
129. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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powers. To keep the two powers separate would be to create a legal
fiction. Unfortunately, because of the present state of Pennsylvania
case law, Pennsylvanians are forced to live with this fiction each and
every day.
The law of regulatory taking is at a point where the United
States Supreme Court is about to recognize the need for compensa-
tion as an additional remedy for an aggrieved landowner whose prop-
erty has been unduly restricted. Pennsylvania, however, has pre-
cluded itself from coming to the same enlightened conclusion due to
the fictional wall it has placed between the police power and the emi-
nent domain power. The Pennsylvania courts should break down this
fictional wall and recognize the realities that affect the landowner as
seen by the landowner himself. Pennsylvania should not be con-
cerned with semantics but ought to be interested in providing an eq-
uitable remedy to this injustice. By overcoming its judicially imposed
semantic limitations, Pennsylvania can align itself with the clear
trend of the United States Supreme Court and become a forerunner
in the area of land use controls.
Marc B. Kramer
ADDENDUM
Since the writing of this comment a number of developments
have taken place concerning the regulatory taking issue. The San
Diego Gas and Electric case was settled. The City of San Diego and
the utility agreed that 225 acres of the coastal wetlands involved
would be protected as a public open-space and that the utility would
retain fifteen acres of nonwetland area for development. The city will
save about 5 million dollars it set aside for paying potential damages,
and the utility will receive $225,000 from the city and 2 million dol-
lars from the state Coastal Conservancy, which gets title to the
land.1 80
More substantively at the federal level, one should see MacDon-
ald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 3 ' which did not provide an
answer to the thorny takings issue. Once again the Supreme Court
ducked the issue when it found that a final disposition had not taken
place at the lower level. There is hope, however, that this issue will
be directly addressed by the Supreme Court in First English Evan-
gelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles County,32
130. 9 ZONING & PLANNING L. REP. 64 (Sept. 1986).
131. 106 S. Ct. 2561 (1986).
132. (No. 85-1199), cert. granted, 54 US.L.W. 3851 (June 2, 1986).
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which presents issues identical to those in MacDonald.
At the state level the reader should note an encouraging case in
support of the theory espoused in this comment. In Corrigan v. City
of Scottsdale,188 it was decided that a landowner is entitled to
money damages for a temporary taking of property by reason of an
invalid zoning ordinance. In Corrigan, the city of Scottsdale passed
an ordinance that put 74 percent of land owned by Joyce Corrigan
into an area rezoned for conservation. The court of appeals held that
there had been an unconstitutional taking without just compensation.
The Supreme Court of Arizona held that once a taking is found, the
Constitution mandates payment of money as damages for any injury
suffered.
133. 55 U.S.L.W. 2051 (June 2, 1986).

